


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MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

FROM : Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Proposed Economic Intelligence Committee

1. The action proposed in this report is in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the memorandum of March 3, 1950, from the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council to the Director of Central Intelligence (Appendix A). This memorandum requires the study of economic security intelligence requirements and facilities throughout the Government and the formulation of a comprehensive plan for satisfying the foreign economic intelligence requirements of national security and for coordinated interagency effort to this end.

2. The Problem - Foreign economic data are now regularly collected and analyzed by some twenty-four agencies of the Government. The nature of such data, the facilities for collection and analysis, and the purposes for which they are sought and used are summarized in Appendix C. This diverse flow of information has been generated to meet the operating or other responsibilities of these several agencies. Much of this information and analytic competence is relevant to one economic aspect or another of national security. Present methods do not adequately provide for the mobilization of the available data and analytic competence around security problems.

3. The first aim of the proposed plan is, therefore, to ensure

regular procedures whereby the full RDP57-00384R00120030071-0 talent of the

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Government can be brought to bear on specific issues involving the national security. The character of these issues is discussed and illustrated in Appendix B.

4. Despite the number of agencies concerned, and the scale of the flow of intelligence data, there are important gaps in the collective knowledge of the Government. Such gaps arise in part from the lack of regular procedures for identifying and filling them, on a high priority basis, through the various existing channels for collection and analysis. The second main aim of the proposed plan is, therefore, to institute procedures for filling the most important of these gaps in our knowledge.

5. One way of approaching the task of preparing a comprehensive plan, as directed by the National Security Council, would be to try to divide the problems and the data into broad categories and to propose a general allocation of responsibility for each category of problem or type of data to a particular agency. It is believed that a formal allocation of responsibility of this kind is neither desirable nor practical at this time, for the following reasons:

(a) General responsibility for the production of economic intelligence cannot be assigned to any one agency since virtually all the agencies now producing such intelligence have an operating need for it in the discharge of their central mission.

(b) As will be evident from an inspection of Appendix B, responsibility cannot be permanently allocated on the basis of the

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problems to be solved, since (1) the problems are continually changing with changes in the international scene; and (2) most of the important problems requiring economic intelligence for their solution are of direct operating concern to two or more agencies.

(c) Formal allocation cannot be made on the basis of skills required or techniques to be employed since in virtually every case more than one agency requires, for its own purposes, people with the particular skill in question.

6. Therefore, what is needed is a continuing machinery for insuring that the available economic intelligence resources are mobilized around security issues, problem by problem, and that where adequate economic intelligence on a particular security issue is not being provided by any agency, responsibility for its provision will be clearly allocated.

7. In the light of these considerations, it is proposed that a committee be established whose principal duty it would be to bring to bear, around concrete, major security issues, the combined economic intelligence resources of the Government. In the course of such selected and concerted studies it is proposed that explicit attention be given to:

- (a) Major gaps and weaknesses in data and analysis
- (b) How these defects should be remedied
- (c) Who should have responsibility for the required action.

Effective coordination among the agencies concerned can only be achieved by selective common effort, focussed on practical and urgent problems.

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8. The gravest threat to the security of the United States and to the whole free world within the foreseeable future stems from the hostile designs and formidable power of the USSR and from the nature of the Soviet system. It is proposed, therefore, that the first critical studies to be carried out should relate to major aspects of the problem of strengthening the relative position of the non-Soviet world in the struggle against the Soviet bloc. Appendix B includes by way of illustration a discussion of various problems of this character, which might be suitable for such combined, critical study.

9. Recommendations - In the light of the above, approval of the Intelligence Advisory Committee is requested for the following action:

(a) The Director of Central Intelligence shall establish an Economic Intelligence Committee, on which shall permanently sit representatives of those agencies charged with primary responsibility for national security intelligence, i.e. the Departments of the Army, Navy, Air Force, State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Any other agency whose interest or competence may be relevant to the particular problem under examination may be invited also to sit with the Economic Intelligence Committee.

(b) The Assistant Director, Office of Research and Reports, Central Intelligence Agency, shall serve as Chairman of the Economic Intelligence Committee, and he shall supply the secretariat.

(c) The Economic Intelligence Committee shall:

(1) Maintain a continuing review of the foreign economic intelligence activities of the USSR and of other governments as they relate to the national security.

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(2) Arrange concerted economic intelligence support, on selected major issues, for studies of interagency interest requested by the Intelligence Advisory Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, etc.

(3) Mobilize the data and analysis available, relevant to appropriate operating problems of any member agency requesting assistance, or of any other agency dealing with economic security problems, which may request assistance.

(4) Review and report, from time to time, on the pertinence, extent, and quality of the data and analyses available, bearing on the issues analyzed, with recommendations to the Intelligence Advisory Committee concerning the means and the agency by which gaps might be filled.

(5) Make such special reviews of economic intelligence distribution and processing procedures as may appear useful, and make recommendations for improvement to the Intelligence Advisory Committee, which shall have responsibility for instituting such action as it may judge appropriate.

(6) Examine continuing programs of basic economic research relating to the national security throughout the United States Government and recommend allocation of responsibility for specific fields of inquiry where such allocation appears appropriate.

(d) In carrying out its responsibilities the Economic Intelligence Committee may set up such subcommittees and working parties as may be judged necessary.

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(e) In the establishment of priorities and allocation of responsibilities for the collection and analysis to fill specific gaps in the economic intelligence needed for national security, the decisions of the Economic Intelligence Committee with regard to such intelligence, shall govern the activities of the IAC agencies in the same manner as decisions of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. Disagreements as to priorities and allocations may be referred to the Intelligence Advisory Committee. Where disagreements arise with respect to the activities of non-IAC agencies, the Intelligence Advisory Committee may refer these to the National Security Council."

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APPENDIX A

TEXT OF NSC ACTION 282

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